The most important and illuminating early writing on Brown v. Bd gives a vivid sense of the social realities that Brown actually confronted-a sense that was entirely missing from the legal culture at the time, and one that often seems to have been lost in contemporary discussions of the Brown problem. Second, Black's essay offers a distinctive understanding of what the equal protection clause should be taken, above all, to forbid: the maintenance of a caste system. That understanding of the clause seems to me correct, and it bears on a number of issues today. Third, Black provides a sophisticated and morally committed version of a certain approach to constitutional
argument, one that retains considerable influence. I think that for all its virtues, his approach suffers from the serious vices of formalism and institutional blindness. In particular, Black's approach suffers from its failure to see the issues that have arisen as a result of the institutional turn of post-1980s constitutional law. 3 We can learn a great deal about Brown by reading Black sympathetically. We can learn something about constitutional interpretation by reading him skeptically. Let us begin by listening to him.
I. The Sovereign Prerogative of Philosophers
Black begins with a two-part argument that he describes as "awkwardly simple." 4 First, the equal protection clause is best read to forbid state law from significantly disadvantaging the Negro race as such. Second, segregation counts as a massive intentional disadvantaging of the Negro race as such. "No subtlety at all. Yet I cannot disabuse myself of the idea that that is really all there is to the segregation cases. If both these propositions can be supported by a preponderance of argument, the cases were rightly decided." 5 Black attempts to support the first proposition by reference to precedent. In several cases, the Court had seemed to endorse it. To be sure, Plessy v. Ferguson 6 appeared to be "a faltering from this principle." But even in Plessy, the Court did not repudiate the principle. On the contrary, the Court found it necessary to show that any disadvantaging from segregation was produced not by state law, but by the "choice" of those who construed it as a form of disadvantaging. Hence the fault of Plessy lay not in The institutional turn has many strands and can be found in many places. See, e.g., Gerald Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope (1993) (emphasizing limitations of courts in producing social change); Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (1999) (raising doubts about judicial review); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877 (1996) (emphasizing common law approach toward Constitution). For my own views, see Cass R. Sunstein, One Case At A Time (1999). 4 Id. at 421. 5 Id. 6 163 US 537 (1896). its treatment of principle, but "in the psychology and sociology" of its approach to racial separation. 7 Of course Black recognizes that the idea of equal protection allows disadvantages to be placed, intentionally, on some people rather than all; bad drivers can be deprived of drivers' licenses. The real question is whether there is a reasonable basis for inequality. This question is not always easy to answer. "But history puts it squarely out of doubt that the chief and all-dominating purpose" of the equal protection clause "was to ensure equal protection for the Negro." 8 Thus the fourteenth amendment rules out all possible arguments for discrimination against African-Americans.
Black is aware that history is not without some ambiguity here and that some people believe that at the time of adoption, the fourteenth amendment was not taken to forbid racial segregation. By way of response, he urges that any judgment about "the 'intent' of the men of 1866 on segregation as we know it calls for a far chancier guess than is commonly supposed, for they were unacquainted with the institution as it prevails in the American South today. To guess their verdict upon the institution as it functions in the mid-twentieth century supposes an imaginary hypothesis which grows more preposterous as it is sought to be made more vivid." 9 It is at this point that Black starts to pick up steam. He asks whether segregation violates the equality principle, properly understood. He acknowledges that equality "has marginal areas where philosophic difficulties are encountered. But if a whole race of people finds itself confined within a system which is set up and continued for the very purpose of keeping it in an inferior station, and if the question is the solemnly propounded whether such a race is being treated 'equally,' I think we ought to exercise one of the sovereign prerogatives of philosophers-that of laughter." This is my favorite sentence in Black's essay; it ranks among the best sentences ever written by an American law professor. 7 Id. at 422. 8 Id. at 423. 9 Id. at 424.
Black continues that the real "question remaining (after we get our laughter under control) is whether" segregation meets that description. Here Black confesses "a tendency to start laughing all over again." The initial reason is that he himself grew up under conditions of segregation, and "it never occurred to anyone, white or colored, to question its meaning." Nor was personal experience the only support for this conclusion.
"Segregation in the South comes down in apostolic succession from slavery and the Dred Scott case. The South fought to keep slavery, and lost. Then it tried the Black Codes, and lost. Then it looked around for something else and found segregation." 10 There was nothing consensual about segregation. It was imposed by whites, not agreed to by all.
Drawing on national experience, Black contends that separate was almost never really equal. When African-Americans were given separate beaches and washrooms, they were far worse than the beaches and washrooms given to whites. In education, "colored schools have been so disgracefully inferior to white schools that only ignorance can excuse those who have remained acquiescent members of a community that lived the Molochian child-destroying lie that put them forward as 'equal.'" 11 Segregation could be understood only in its historical setting, as part of a culture in which a "society that has just lost the Negro as a slave, that has just lost out in an attempt to put him under quasiservile 'Codes,' the society that views his blood as a contamination and his name as an insult, the society that extralegally imposes on him every humiliating mark of low caste and that until yesterday kept him in line by lynching . . ." Those who see what segregation actually means will not fall victim to arguments that amount to "one-stepahead-of-the-marshal correction" (another memorable phrase from Black, capturing many forms of legal argument).
Black also seeks to explain the evident puzzlement of those in the legal culture about the plain "fact that the social meaning of segregation is the putting of the Negro in a position of walled-off inferiority." 12 Here again we can hear Black's ringing laughter. Houston was an exceptionally distinguished lawyer, unable to eat lunch with his white co-counsel in the nation's capitol when engaged in legal argument before the nation's highest court. In this world (almost)
anything is possible, but it would be astonishing if Houston "did not suffer more than" 12 Id. at 427. 13 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv L Rev 1 (1959). 14 Wechsler, supra note, at 34. 15 Id.
Wechsler as a result of racial segregation. In any case Wechsler's general challenge to Brown was simple: A preference for one set of associational preferences seems to violate the obligation of neutrality. How can a Court committed to neutral principles choose one set over another? To this Black responds that Wechsler has badly misconceived the idea of equality and hence that of neutrality. Of course any requirement of equality will "entail some disagreeableness for" those who benefit from inequality. In other words, the idea of equality does not counsel equality between equality and inequality; it favors the former.
If the fourteenth amendment is committed to equality, then it settles the question of how to handle the conflict between the competing associational claims.
Black concludes that Brown is correct if the Constitution is "inconsistent with any
device that in fact relegates the Negro race to a position of inferiority." 16 In an uncannily prescient statement, he urges that "in the end the decisions will be accepted by the profession on just that basis." He contends that the Court's "judgments, in law and in fact, are as right and true as any that ever was uttered." In a footnote, Black makes just one critical remark about the Court's opinion, as distinct from its holding: "the venial fault of the opinion consists in its not spelling out that segregation . . . is perceptibly a means of ghettoizing the imputedly inferior race. (I would conjecture that the motive for this omission was reluctance to go into the distasteful details of the southern caste system.)"
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II. Caste and Context
Black's essay has two cardinal virtues. The first is that he provides a clear and appealing interpretation of the equal protection clause. In Black's view, the clause forbids state law from creating anything like a caste system. He uses the term "caste" twice, and an anticaste principle 18 unambiguously infuses his treatment of the problem of segregation and indeed the principle for which he takes the equal protection clause to 16 Black, supra, at 429. 17 Id. 18 20 in which the Court struck down a ban on racial intermarriage with a reference to the effort to maintain "White Supremacy." 21 But in the modern era, the equal protection clause has been read to forbid governments from drawing distinctions on the basis of race 22 -a reading that is fundamentally different from Black's. Notice that Black did not contend that segregation was unlawful because it amounted to an effort to make race relevant for purposes of policy; he did not argue for a principle of color-blindness.
His claim was that segregation was unlawful because it amounted to an effort to keep one group below another-to maintain the Southern caste system. In the modern era, this view of the equal protection clause has had only one strong endorsement in a majority opinion: Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court in the Virginia Military Institute case. 23 I believe that the anticaste principle is the correct reading of the clause, even though its implementation would impose formidable burdens on courts. 24 The second virtue of Black's essay is that it offers a vivid, concrete, and realistic understanding of segregation-a historicized understanding that cuts through the almost emphasis on the need to attend to "social meaning" is highly illuminating here; he rightly suggests that segregation can be appreciated only if it is taken as a particular practice in the American South. He is also correct to suggest that we ought to meet with "laughter" the question whether racial segregation might not be a way of treating African-Americans equally. Not incidentally, and in Black's spirit, I believe that laughter is also the appropriate reaction to the equally solemn question, usually answered "yes" by the current Supreme Court, 25 whether affirmative action programs deprive white Americans of the equal protection of the laws. To be sure, such programs present difficult questions of policy; they are often bad ideas. But on the constitutional question, the extraordinary success of constitutional assaults on affirmative action programs is shocking and disgraceful.
Black's understanding of the anticaste principle does leave many open questions.
At times he speaks of purpose. At times he speaks of effect, as in the suggestion that the Constitution "is inconsistent with any device that in fact relegates the Negro race to a position of inferiority." We can imagine cases in which either intent or effect is operative, but not both. In any case many officials practices might be seen as entrenching a caste system based on race. Does Black's principle raise doubts about poll taxes, literacy tests for voting, educational funding systems that disproportionately benefit whites, or admissions requirements for universities that ensure overwhelming white student bodies?
Would Black's principle raise questions about inadequate welfare and job training programs? Do these also "relegate" African-Americans to a position of inferiority? And if the equal protection clause forbids the maintenance of a system of racial caste, does it also forbid the maintenance of a caste system based on gender? It would be possible to generalize, from Black's understanding of the equal protection clause, a principle that forbids all official practices that turn morally irrelevant characteristics into a basis for social subordination. Such a generalization is very much in the spirit of Black's analysis.
But is this what he intends? And would the anticaste principle, thus understood, bear on current debates about discrimination on the basis of disability and sexual orientation? 24 See id. 25 See note XX supra.
Would it require something like an Americans with Disabilities Act as a matter of constitutional law? Would it require states to recognize same-sex marriages?
On Black's behalf we might respond that however these questions might be answered, the segregation issue was an easy one. With respect to that issue, the conventional responses do have a "one-step-ahead-of-the-marshal" character. It is hardly a decisive objection to Black's argument that he has not specified all of its implications.
Insofar as Black sketched an appealing conception of the equal protection clause, and memorably argued why segregation is inconsistent with that conception, he provided an enduring service for the legal culture.
III. Of Formalism and Institution-Blindness
The vices of Black's essay are as interesting as its virtues, and they are no less think that this interpretation is at least textually plausible. In any case, a great deal of historical research supports the view that the Fourteenth Amendment was not meant to eliminate racial segregation and indeed that it was not meant to prohibit all intentional disadvantaging of African-Americans. 26 The Reconstruction Congress expressly permitted the schools of the District of Columbia to remain segregated. 27 The Fourteenth
Amendment was meant to constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the sponsors of that Act specifically disclaimed any intention to interfere with segregated education. 28 In these circumstances, it is implausible to say that the equal protection clause necessarily has the meaning that Black ascribes to it. On narrow "originalist" grounds, What tools is he actually using? To the extent that Black's reading emerges as permissive, a choice among plausible alternatives, we should see him as engaged in a distinctive kind of legal formalism-regrettably, the dishonorable kind, 31 one that pretends that a legal text has an unambiguous meaning even though normative judgments must be made in order to invest it with that meaning. For a modern analogue, consider the view, endorsed by a majority of the current Supreme Court, that strict scrutiny is required for affirmative action programs because the Constitution forbids states from denying equal protection to "any person." 32 This too is a form of dishonorable formalism: The fact that the clause protects "any person" is neither here nor there on the question whether strict scrutiny, or something else, should be applied to affirmative action programs.
In the end, Black's reading of the equal protection clause can only be understood interpretive in Ronald Dworkin's sense of the word. 33 Black is attempting not to track the unambiguous meaning of that clause but to make best constructive sense of it, in a way that inevitably involves judgments of Black's own. Among the various possible interpretations, those that "fit" the clause and its history, Black is venturing an approach that seems most attractive to him on normative grounds. This point is not meant as an objection to Black's conclusions about the clause or the case. For constitutional interpretation, there is no avoiding normative judgments of one or another kind. 34 And perhaps his interpretation is preferable to any other; in fact I believe that it is. 35 The problem is that Black does not defend his approach against imaginable alternatives; he writes as if the principle can be read off the Constitution itself. If we were to be harsh, we might even say that Black's confidence about his view of the clause emerges as a form of self-delusion, a claim of necessity that masks normative judgments of Black's own. 31 This kind of dishonorable formalism is an ugly sibling of the entirely honorable (though controversial) view that texts should be interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning and that judges ought not to rely on legislative history, statutory "purpose," and the like. The best discussion is Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, NYU L Rev. 32 
B. Black and Judicial Fallibility
The second problem is that Black neglect institutional issues. He see his tasks as twofold: first, identification of the proper reading of the equal protection clause and second, measurement of segregation against the clause, properly read. This approach to the Constitution was typical of academic work in the 1960s and 1970s. It remains common today. But it has a significant weakness. Black does not admit the possibility that for a court, the proper reading of the clause is closely attuned to the institutional limitations of judges. The institutional turn of post-1980s scholarship has pointed to several reasons why this might be so. Judicial efforts to promote social reform might not be productive; they might even be counterproductive, endangering the very goals that the judges seek. 36 Judicial judgments about (legally relevant) moral values might not be reliable, and hence it might be best if judges, aware of their own moral fallibility, are reluctant to impose those values on the nation. 37 In any case judicial insistence on certain moral commitments, even appealing ones, might preempt democratic deliberation on the underlying questions; and if citizens have a right to be self-governing, judges might be interpret the Constitution with that right in mind.
If any of these claims is correct, then judges with a set of reasonable, optional interpretations might select the interpretation that the one that minimizes the judicial role in American society-not because that interpretation is best out of context, but because it is best-suited to judicial capacities. Emphasizing that their own readings are prone to error, judges might read constitutional clauses, whenever possible, in such a way as to minimize judicial intrusions into democratic processes. James Bradley Thayer famously defended "the rule of clear mistake"-the view that courts should uphold legislation unless it is unambiguously unconstitutional. 38 A limited reading of the equal protection clause, one that would not reach segregation, might be defended on the ground that it 36 See Rosenberg, supra note. 37 disserves the very values at stake-a possibility that is relevant, whether or not it is decisive, for constitutional law. 42 Alternatively, judges might have chosen to read the equal protection clause narrowly in the particular context of segregation, not because they are generally errorprone, but in the interest of ensuring that courts are not placed in an especially difficult remedial role. There can be no doubt that the political question doctrine has a pale echo in the numerous cases interpreting constitutional clauses so as to avoid collisions with other institutions. 43 In some contexts, the echo deserves to be a bit louder, simply because a ruling would force courts to engage in managerial tasks that are beyond their competence. Black does not confront this possibility in the context of school segregation, and it is a serious gap in his argument. His silence here is characteristic. Later in his life, Black made eloquent pleas on behalf of a constitutional requirement that governments provide a decent economic minimum --a social safety net below which no citizen may be allowed to fall. 44 Put to one side the question whether this requirement can be found in the Constitution through appropriate interpretive methods. Even if it can, judicial oversight of the welfare system would put courts in a position for which they are especially ill-suited. 45 None of this means that Brown is wrong; like nearly everyone else (now, as opposed to during the 1960s, when the legal culture was sharply divided), I believe that Black was right to insist that it was right. But Black's argument on its behalf is badly incomplete. It is not sufficient to identify the most appealing interpretation of a clause and then to measure a challenged practice against that interpretation. A pervasive question has to do with judicial capacities and competence. Wechsler's closing question was this: "Given a situation where the state must practically choose between denying the association to those who wish it or imposing it on those who would avoid it, is there a basis in neutral principles for holding that the Constitution demands that the claims for association should prevail?" 46 Questions like this continue to haunt the legal system. But Black's answer is simple. By its very nature, the equality principle is not neutral between inequality and equality; and this is not an embarrassment for the equality principle. That answer is not just Black's but Brown's as well. I think that it has enduring and insufficiently appreciated implications for constitutional law in general. 45 I discuss this question in Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (1993). 46 Wechsler, supra note.
Conclusion
